--===Washington State Courts - Opinions===--
_Washington State Supreme Court
Opinions: Estate of Mary Margaret Kerr; v. Susan Ruegg V. Stacy Bennett _
Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 64881-6
Title of Case: Estate of Mary Margaret Kerr;
v.
Susan Ruegg V. Stacy Bennett
File Date: 01/22/98
Oral Argument Date: 09/23/97
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court,
King County;
95-4-00169-3
Honorable James W. Bates Jr, Judge.
JUSTICES
--------
Authored by Charles Z. Smith
Concurring: Barbara Durham
James M. Dolliver
Richard P. Guy
Charles W. Johnson
Barbara A. Madsen
Gerry L. Alexander
Philip A. Talmadge
Richard B. Sanders
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Scott A. Johnson
Stokes Eitelbach & Lawrence
Ste 4000
800 5th Ave
Seattle, WA 98104
Laura J. Buckland
Ste 4000
800 5th Ave
Seattle, WA 98104-3179
Counsel for Respondent(s)
John P. Mele
Ryan Swanson & Cleveland
Suite 3400
1201 3rd Ave
Seattle, WA 98101
Robert W. Bryan
Ryan Swanson & Cleveland
1201 3rd Ave Ste 3400
Seattle, WA 98101-3034
Paul A. Cantor
Northern Life
1110 3rd Ave
Seattle, WA 98111
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)
IN RE ESTATE OF MARY ) Number 64881-6
MARGARET KERR, DECEASED; )
STACY R. BENNETT, )
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, )
)
Petitioner ) En Banc
)
v. )
)
SUSAN RUEGG, )
)
Respondent ) Filed January 22, 1998
)
SMITH, J. Petitioner Stacy R. Bennett, personal representative in a
decedent estate, seeks review of a Court of Appeals per curiam decision
which reversed a judgment of the King County Superior Court awarding
attorneys' fees to the estate of Mary Margaret Kerr on behalf of
Petitioner, personal representative of the estate, who successfully
resisted her removal in a probate proceeding. We granted review. We
reverse.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented in this case is whether, under the general
fee provision of the Probate Code, RCW 11.96.140,1 courts may award
discretionary attorneys' fees in removal proceedings or whether that
provision is inapplicable because the specific section of RCW 11.68.070 2
relating to removal of a personal representative is the exclusive authority
for award of attorneys' fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 3, 1995, Mary Margaret Kerr died leaving a will.3 It
contained specific bequests to each of her five grandchildren, including
Petitioner Stacy R. Bennett, and designated her daughter, Respondent Susan
Ruegg, as residuary beneficiary.4 Ms. Kerr named Petitioner, Stacy R.
Bennett, her granddaughter who is also Respondent's daughter, as personal
representative5 of her estate valued at about $24,000.6 Upon admission of
Ms. Kerr's will to probate in the King County Superior Court, the court
issued letters testamentary appointing Petitioner Stacy R. Bennett as
personal representative, as directed by the will, on January 6, 1995.7
Respondent Susan Ruegg and Petitioner Bennett are mother and
daughter. They have been estranged since Petitioner's childhood. Intense
animosity between them led to mutual accusations of dishonesty and
misconduct in this proceeding brought by the mother to remove the daughter
as personal representative of the estate of Respondent's mother who was
Petitioner's maternal grandmother.8 On March 30, 1995, Respondent filed a
motion which included removal of Petitioner as personal representative,
appointment of an independent personal representative, and a full
accounting of estate assets.9 On May 5, 1995, King County Superior Court
Commissioner Maurice M. Epstein granted the motion removing Petitioner as
personal representative.10 Petitioner brought a motion for revision on
June 8, 1995.11 Judge Joan E. DuBuque reversed the commissioner's ruling
and reinstated Petitioner as personal representative.12
Petitioner Stacy R. Bennett then brought a motion for attorneys'
fees under the general fee provision in RCW Chapter 11.96, which governs
jurisdiction and procedure in probate actions. Referring to the general
fee provision of RCW 11.96.140, Petitioner sought an award of attorneys'
fees and costs incurred by the estate in successfully opposing Respondent's
motion for removal.13 On July 18, 1995, King County Superior Court Judge
Jim Bates awarded attorneys' fees of $4,076.20, one-half the amount sought,
in favor of the estate of Mary Margaret Kerr against Respondent Susan
Ruegg. The order provided:
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Estate's
Petition for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Court
has considered the petition, the declaration of Scott A.W.
Johnson and the exhibits thereto, the response of Susan
Ruegg, the Declaration of Craig E. Schuman, the Declaration
of Paul A. Cantor and exhibits thereto, and the other
pleadings filed in this matter.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Estate's
request for an award of its attorneys' fees and costs shall
be and hereby is GRANTED in part.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Estate shall be
awarded in its favor against Susan Ruegg one half of its
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in responding
to Susan Ruegg's petition and in filing the request for
attorneys' fees and cost in the amount of $4076.20. Susan
Ruegg shall be liable to the estate in that amount.{14}
On July 28, 1995, a King County court commissioner entered judgment
as follows:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to RCW 4.64.030, the following information
should be entered in the Clerk's Execution Docket:
1. Judgment Creditor: The Estate of Mary Margaret Kerr
2. Judgment Creditor's Attorneys: Lora L. Brown and Scott
A.W. Johnson and the firm of Stokes, Eitelbach & Lawrence,
P.S.
3. Judgment Debtor: Margaret Susan Kerr Bennett Hartmann
Ruegg (formerly known as Susan or Sue Bennett or Susan or
Sue Hartmann, and currently known as Susan or Sue Ruegg)
("Susan Ruegg").
4. Amount of Judgment: $4076.20
5. Amount of Interest Owed to Date of Judgment: $0
6. Total of Taxable Costs and Attorneys' Fees: $0
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER came before the Court on presentation by
Stacy R. Bennett, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Mary Margaret Kerr, of a judgment for money due by Susan
Ruegg. The judgment was presented pursuant to RCW 4.60.070
and based on the Court's order awarding attorneys' fees and
costs which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Based on the
foregoing:
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT in favor of the Estate
of Mary Margaret Kerr against Susan Ruegg in the amount of
$4,076.20.{15}
On August 15, 1995, Respondent Susan Ruegg appealed the award of
attorneys' fees,16 arguing that the award under RCW 11.96.140 is contrary
to the fee provision in RCW 11.68.070. Referring to RCW Chapter 11.68,
which provides for settlement of small estates without administration, she
argued that the specific fee provision of RCW 11.68.070 applied and not the
general fee provision of RCW 11.96.140.17
In an unpublished per curiam decision dated November 4, 1996, the
Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed the judgment against Respondent,
holding that the more general fee provision in RCW 11.96.140 does not apply
where another specific section of the probate code has its own fee
provision.18
The personal representative of the estate, Petitioner Bennett,
petitioned this Court for review which we granted on April 2, 1997.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends she is entitled to attorneys' fees under the
general probate statute, RCW 11.96.140. She contends that under rules of
statutory construction, in construing potential conflict between general
and specific statutes, courts must harmonize the statutes, if at all
possible, and consider legislative intent. According to Petitioner, the
Court of Appeals did not attempt to harmonize the statutes nor consider
legislative intent and therefore its decision conflicts with decisions of
this Court. Petitioner also contends this Court has awarded attorneys'
fees under RCW 11.96.140 in similar cases where the litigation did not
substantially benefit the estate.
Conversely, Respondent asserts this Court has consistently held that
a specific statute supersedes a general statute when both might apply or
when the general provision conflicts with the specific provision.
According to Respondent, consistent with our decisions, the Court of
Appeals properly determined that because the statutes are in conflict, the
specific provision supersedes the general provision. Respondent also
claims attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140 are not appropriate in this case
because the litigation ultimately benefited the estate. Both Petitioner
and Respondent raise questions of public policy.
Rules of Statutory Construction
Relying on Omega Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marquardt,19 Petitioner contends
the court may award discretionary attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140
without relying solely upon RCW 11.68.070. In Omega, insurance companies
challenged the Insurance Commissioner's authority to regulate life
insurance rates. They argued that the specific statute authorizing the
Commissioner to regulate rates did not apply to life insurance. The
companies claimed that the specific rate chapter of the statute controlled
over the general chapter authorizing the Commissioner to regulate unfair
practices because specific statutes prevail over general ones. This Court
concluded the two statutes could be harmonized and the specific statute did
not prevent application of the general one, stating:
In interpreting a statute, we are obliged to construe the
enactment as a whole, and to give effect to all language
used. Every provision must be viewed in relation to other
provisions and harmonized if at all possible. Preference is
given a more specific statute only if the two statutes deal
with the same subject matter and conflict to such an extent
that they cannot be harmonized.{20}
Petitioner also cites State v. Board of Yakima County Comm'rs,
quoting this Court's statement that "{i}t is the duty of the court to
reconcile apparently conflicting statutes and to give effect to each of
them, if this can be achieved without distortion of the language used."21
Relying upon Omega and Yakima, Petitioner contends that courts can
harmonize the specific and general statutes governing attorneys' fees in
probate proceedings because the statutes are not in conflict.
The specific statute, RCW 11.68.070, allows courts to award
attorneys' fees when a party challenging a personal representative is
successful and the powers of the personal representative are restricted.
That statute does not mention attorneys' fees for a personal representative
who successfully defends against a challenge, as in this case. The general
statute, RCW 11.96.140, allows courts to award attorneys' fees to any party
in a probate action "as justice may require." Petitioner argues that
because RCW 11.68.070 does not prohibit award of attorneys' fees to a
successful personal representative, the two statutes would be harmonized by
allowing attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140.
Historically, this Court has followed the rule that each provision
of a statute should be read together with other provisions in order to
determine legislative intent. "The purpose of reading statutory provisions
in pari materia with related provisions is to determine the legislative
intent underlying the entire statutory scheme and read the provisions `as
constituting a unified whole, to the end that a harmonious, total statutory
scheme evolves which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes.'" 22
Citing Spokane County Fire Protec. Dist. No. 9 v. Spokane County
Boundary Review Bd.,23 Petitioner relies on this Court's statement of the
rule that "a general statute prevails over a previously enacted special
statute where such appears to have been the legislative intent."
Petitioner correctly states that the Legislature enacted the specific
statute, RCW 11.68.070, in 1974, and enacted the general statute, RCW
11.96.140, ten years later in 1984. Petitioner offers no authority to
support a conclusion that the Legislature intended RCW 11.96.140 to
supersede RCW 11.68.070. However, comparison of the enactment dates and
reading each statute in relation to the other does provide a reasonable
basis upon which we may determine legislative intent.
In contrast, Respondent contends RCW 11.68.070 supersedes RCW
11.96.140. Without discussing each case, Respondent cites State v. Halsen,24
Waste Management of Seattle, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp Comm'n,25 and Bowles
v. Washington Dep't of Retirement Sys.,26 arguing that this Court has
uniformly held that a specific statute supersedes a general statute when
both might apply. In Halsen, this Court concluded that a general statute
does not apply where there is a more specific statute. In Waste
Management, this Court determined that a specific statute will supersede a
general one when both apply. However, the Court also stated that statutes
relating to the same subject "`are to be read together as constituting a
unified whole, to the end that a harmonious total statutory scheme evolves
which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes.'" 27 The Court
concluded that statutes should be read as complementary, instead of as in
conflict with each other.28 But in Bowles, this Court determined that when
two statutes are in apparent conflict, the more specific statute is given
preference.
Referring to former RCW 11.96.070(7), now RCW 11.96.070(3),29
Respondent contends the provisions of RCW 11.96 apply only when they do not
conflict with "other chapters" of the probate code. The section involved
in this case, RCW Chapter 11.68, is not one of the chapters referred to in
RCW 11.96.070(7). Respondent nevertheless reasons that the general
provision of RCW 11.96.140 conflicts with the specific provision of RCW
11.68.070. RCW 11.68.070 provides for award of attorneys' fees when a
petitioner successfully persuades the court to remove or restrict the
powers of a personal representative. Respondent argues that because the
statute does not authorize imposition of attorneys' fees against an
unsuccessful petitioner, an award of attorneys' fees in such cases under
RCW 11.96.140 directly conflicts with the specific provision.
Respondent bolsters her argument that the two statutes conflict by
citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri 30 and State v. Williams.31 In both cases,
this Court recognized that when a statute specifically designates the class
of things upon which it operates, it can be inferred that the Legislature
intended to exclude any omitted class. Consequently, Respondent contends
that when the Legislature enacted RCW 11.68.070, it restricted attorneys'
fees to petitioners who are successful in their removal action, thereby
expressing its intent that personal representatives who successfully oppose
petitions for removal or restriction are not entitled to attorneys' fees.
Respondent concludes that awarding discretionary attorneys' fees in such
cases under RCW 11.96.140 conflicts with RCW 11.68.070. However, as noted
by Petitioner, in Williams, this Court cautioned that "the maxim of express
mention and implicit exclusion "`is to be used only as a means of
ascertaining the legislative intent where it is doubtful, and not as a
means of defeating the apparent intent of the legislature.""'32
Quoting Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Employment Sec.,33
Respondent claims this Court uniformly limits attorneys' fees based upon
statutes to those instances specifically stated, and uniformly denies
attorneys' fees in areas not addressed in the relevant statute. In
Pennsylvania Life, this Court stated that "where the Legislature provides
for the allowance of attorney fees, it creates a substantive right and not
a procedural remedy, and it attaches only as provided in the statute."34 An
employer who prevailed in an employment case was denied attorneys' fees
because the specific statute only authorized fees for a prevailing
applicant.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondent and concluded that the
specific provision, RCW 11.68.070, governs in this case. The court
reasoned that the more general fee provision in RCW 11.96.140 does not
apply where another specific section of the probate code has its own fee
provision. The court referred to former RCW 11.96.070(7),35 now RCW
11.96.070(3), stating that the provisions of RCW 11.96 apply only where
they do not conflict with other chapters of the probate code.36
The Court of Appeals also agreed with Respondent's application of
the rule followed by this Court in Williams that when a statute
specifically designates the thing or classes of things upon which it
operates, it can be inferred that the Legislature intended to exclude what
is omitted:
In this case, the statute {RCW 11.96.140} allows attorney
fees only where the court decides to restrict the powers of
the personal representative. Omitting mention of an
unsuccessful petition indicates the intent to exclude
attorney fees in such cases. Because the statute does not
allow for fees in case of an unsuccessful removal petition,
the court in this case had no authority to award fees to the
estate."{37}
Washington Case Law
Petitioner Bennett contends attorneys' fees are justified under RCW
11.96.140 because Respondent's petition for removal provided no benefit to
the estate and in fact severely depleted its assets. According to
Petitioner, Respondent wanted appointment of another "independent" personal
representative merely to protect her own personal interests in the estate.
Petitioner claims such an appointment would have cost the estate even more
in administration fees and expenses.
Citing In re Estate of Niehenke,38 Petitioner reasons that the
estate is entitled to attorneys' fees because this Court has determined
that recent Washington cases suggest "it is inappropriate to assess fees
against an estate when the litigation could result in no substantial
benefit to the estate." In Niehenke, this Court cited 4 William J. Bowe &
Douglas H. Parker, Page on Wills sec.31.13, at 218 (1961), in stating that
"it has been held that where the services of the attorneys are rendered
solely for the benefit of certain parties and are not for the benefit of
the estate, attorneys' fees should not be awarded out of the estate, even
though the estate is incidentally benefited by having adverse claims
decided." The major issue in Niehenke concerned exercise of an option to
purchase a farm which involved no substantial benefit to the estate. The
Court determined the litigation involved a contest between rival claimants
to an estate asset and that awarding attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140
would therefore not be appropriate. The Court also concluded that
awarding attorneys' fees from the estate to the prevailing party would
result in unfair costs to beneficiaries not involved in the litigation.
Countering Petitioner's arguments, Respondent contends her petition
ultimately benefited the estate. She claims Petitioner, as personal
representative, did not provide a timely inventory required under RCW
11.44.015.39 In her petition, Respondent sought and obtained from the Court
Commissioner an order directing Petitioner to render an accounting.
Respondent thus asserts that, even assuming RCW 11.96.140 is the applicable
statute, justice does not require award of attorneys' fees to the estate.
Following Niehenke, this Court stated in In re Estate of Baird,40 "In
determining whether an award of fees should be made from the assets of an
estate under this chapter {RCW 11.96.140}, this court has followed the rule
that it is inappropriate to assess fees against the estate when the
litigation could result in no substantial benefit to the estate." Baird
involved rival claimants to a portion of the estate. This Court stated
that determining which claimant should prevail would not substantially
benefit the estate itself, and, additionally, an award to either party
would result in the known beneficiary funding attorneys' fees for the
contesting parties. This Court held that neither of the parties was
entitled to attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140.
Similarly, in In re Estate of Larson,41 this Court held that the
litigating parties are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees if they can
demonstrate an overall benefit to the estate. Applying the same reasoning
in In re Estate of Riemcke,42 this Court concluded that the respondent's
action resulted in an increase of estate assets and thus the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. This Court
affirmed a similar ruling by the trial court in In re Estate of Hamilton43
in which the court awarded attorneys' fees for legal services which
benefited the entire estate and not merely individual beneficiaries.
Public Policy Considerations
Respondent urges this Court to consider the public policy underlying
RCW 11.68.070. According to Respondents, the right to seek removal of a
personal representative under the specific removal statute is the only
mechanism available for monitoring the conduct of personal representatives
with nonintervention powers. Respondent argues that the provision does not
allow imposing attorneys' fees against unsuccessful petitioners seeking
removal because such a provision would substantially interfere with a
beneficiary's ability to protect the estate from improper conduct by a
personal representative.
Petitioner argues that prohibiting award of attorneys' fees to an
estate forced to defend against petitions for removal of its personal
representative would foster meritless and bad faith removal actions by
eliminating any financial risk to the moving party. According to
Petitioner, this result is particularly harsh and unjust for small estates
whose assets would be depleted in defending such removal suits. Petitioner
argues that beneficiaries who have valid grounds for challenging a personal
representative would not be deterred because courts are allowed to award
attorneys' fees "as justice may require" under RCW 11.96.140.
This Court has not previously addressed the public policy
underlying
RCW 11.68.070. Although the Court of Appeals agreed with Respondent, its
observation does not clearly articulate a cognizable public policy.44
The award of attorneys' fees to an estate, whose personal representative
successfuly defends an action for removal, is consistent with the public
policy underlying our probate code.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Under rules of statutory construction, each provision of a statute
should be read together with related provisions to determine the
legislative intent underlying the entire statutory scheme. Reading the
provisions as a unified whole maintains the integrity of the respective
statutes. A more specific statute supersedes a general statute only if
the two statutes pertain to the same subject matter and conflict to the
extent they cannot be harmonized. The maxim of express mention and
implicit exclusion should not be used to defeat legislative intent. The
Court of Appeals in this case did not harmonize the statutes, RCW 11.96.140
and RCW 11.68.070, to determine legislative intent.
The specific probate statute, RCW 11.68.070, allows an award of
attorneys' fees when a petitioner successfully persuades the court to
remove or restrict the powers of a personal representative. That statute
does not refer to attorneys' fees in instances in which the personal
representative successfully defends against such a challenge, as in this
case. The general probate statute, RCW 11.96.140, allows courts to award
attorneys' fees to any party in a probate action "as justice may require."
Former RCW 11.96.070(7), now RCW 11.96.070(3), cited by the Court of
Appeals, states that the provisions of Chapter 11.96 shall not supersede
otherwise applicable provisions of certain enumerated chapters. The
statute involved in this case, RCW Chapter 11.68, is not one of the
chapters enumerated.
The statutes in this case are not in conflict because RCW 11.68.070
does not prohibit award of attorneys' fees to a successful personal
representative. The specific and general statutes would be harmonized by
allowing discretionary award of attorneys' fees under RCW 11.96.140.
Washington case law supports an award of attorneys' fees in this
case under RCW 11.96.140. As in Niehenke and Baird, this case involves a
dispute between two beneficiaries, Petitioner and Respondent, over exercise
of the powers of a personal representative. There was no substantial
benefit to the estate. Yet, the estate, and indirectly its other
beneficiaries, bore the cost of the litigation.. Under these circumstances
the trial court had discretion to award attorneys' fees to the estate "as
justice may require." Award of attorneys' fees in probate proceedings
under RCW 11.96.140, in conjunction with RCW 11.68.070, adheres to a
harmonious, total statutory scheme and serves to protect the interests of
an estate.
We reverse the per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed the judgment of the King County Superior Court awarding attorneys'
fees to the Estate of Mary Margaret Kerr, Deceased, whose personal
representative is Petitioner Stacy R. Bennett.
We deny the request of Respondent Susan Ruegg for attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in opposing this petition for review under RAP 18.9 (a).
1 RCW 11.96.140 "Costs Attorneys' fees. Either the superior court or
the court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs, including
attorneys' fees, to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the
assets of the estate or trust or nonprobate asset, as justice may require."
2 RCW 11.68.070 "Procedure when personal representative recreant to
trust or subject to removal . . . . In the event the court shall restrict
the powers of the personal representative in any manner, it shall endorse
the words "Powers restricted" upon the original order of solvency together
with the date of said endorsement, and in all such cases the cost of the
citation, hearing, and reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded as the
court determines."
3 Clerk's Papers at 66.
4 Clerk's Papers at 81-82.
5 Clerk's Papers at 81.
6 Clerk's Papers at 35-37.
7 Clerk's Papers at 87.
8 Clerk's Papers at 142-57, 290-97.
9 Clerk's Papers at 65-78.
10 Clerk's Papers at 127-29.
11 Clerk's Papers at 3.
12 Clerk's Papers at 33.
13 Clerk's Papers at 1-8.
14 Clerk's Papers at 137-38.
15 Clerk's Papers at 140-41.
16 Clerk's Papers at 134-35.
17 Br. of Appellant at 7-8.
18 Pet. for Review, App. A at 3.
19 115 Wn.2d 416, 425, 799 P.2d 235 (1990).
20 115 Wn.2d at 425 (footnotes omitted).
21 123 Wn.2d 451, 459-60, 869 P.2d 56 (1994) (citing Tommy P. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 97 Wn.2d 385, 391-92, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)).
22 State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 547, 617 P.2d 1012, 24 A.L.R. 4th
1191 (1980) (quoting State v. Wright, 84 Wn.2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453
(1974)). See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wn.2d 128, 133, 814 P.2d
629 (1991) (citing State v. Sommerville, 111 Wn.2d 524, 531, 760 P.2d 932
(1988) (each provision of the statute should be read in relation to the
other provisions, and the statute should be construed as a whole)).
23 97 Wn.2d 922, 925-26, 652 P.2d 1356 (1982).
24 111 Wn.2d 121, 122, 757 P.2d 531 (1988).
25 123 Wn.2d 621, 630, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994).
26 121 Wn.2d 52, 78, 847 P.2d 440 (1993).
27 123 Wn.2d at 630 (quoting Wright, 84 Wn.2d at 650).
28 Id.
29 "RCW 11.96.070(7) . . . . The provisions of this chapter shall not
supersede the otherwise applicable provisions and procedures of chapter
11.24, 11.28, 11.40, 11.52, 11.56, or 11.60 RCW with respect to any rights
or legal obligations that are subject to those chapters."
30 117 Wn.2d at 133-34.
31 94 Wn.2d at 537.
32 94 Wn.2d at 537 (quoting DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 12,
297 P.2d 940 (1956)).
33 97 Wn.2d 412, 414, 645 P.2d 693 (1982).
34 97 Wn.2d at 414.
35 See Bentzen v. Demmons, 68 Wn. App. 339, 349-50, 842 P.2d 1015 (1993).
36 Pet. for Review, App. A at 3.
37 Pet. for Review, App. A at 4.
38 117 Wn.2d 631, 648, 818 P.2d 1324 (1991).
39 RCW 11.44.015 "Inventory. Within three months after his appointment,
unless a longer time shall be granted by the court, every personal
representative shall make and return upon oath into the court a true
inventory of all of the property of the estate which shall have come to his
possession or knowledge, including a statement of all encumbrances, liens
or other secured charges against any item."
40 131 Wn.2d 514, 521-22, 933 P.2d 1031 (1997).
41 103 Wn.2d 517, 534, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985).
42 80 Wn.2d 722, 736, 497 P.2d 1319 (1972).
43 73 Wn.2d 865, 869, 441 P.2d 768 (1968).
44 Pet. for Review, App. A at 4.